Child Custody Domestic Violence False Allegations Istanbul Convention Law & Justice Legal



D. Jesús Muñoz

Dª María Legaz

National Association for Assistance to Victims of Domestic Violence (Asociacion Nacional de Ayuda a Victimas de Ayuda de Violencia Doméstica)

24 January 2023

The passage of the LIVG, the comprehensive law against gender-based violence, in Spain in 2004 has led to the violation of the fundamental rights of all heterosexual citizens, especially loss of the “presumption of innocence.”

The socialist party, from which this ideology of copyright criminal law
originated, had on the table, according to public statements by one of its proponents, safeguarding the protection of victims or the presumption of innocence. They opted for the protection of victims, destroying the “presumption of innocence” for hundreds of thousands of men in the past 18 years.

The gender violence law is based on the study of the Minneapolis mandatory arrest law.

From 2004 to 2022, there have been more than 2,260,000 judicial
proceedings, with more than 1,705,000 defendants ending up being declared innocent. This means that innocent people have been prosecuted with public money, depriving them of their liberty. By applying Article 544 TER of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, they have been separated from their children, with jail detentions of 24 and 72 hours. These detentions normally take place on weekends, beginning on Fridays, so the man spends the whole weekend in a jail with deplorable hygienic conditions. The man is in a state of shock, not knowing why he has been deprived of liberty, expelled from his house with only what he was wearing. and deprived of his children’s visitation regime.

An average of more than 455 men are arrested every day in Spain for allegations of gender violence, based solely on the word of a woman. An average of 160,000 men are prosecuted each year as terrorists. Year after year, it has been shown that more than 80% of them, who have been deprived of their liberty, are declared innocent, according to data from the General Council of the Judiciary.

Hundreds of billions of euros are spent in Spain, coming from the European Union, squandered by political parties. As an example, between 2014 and 2016 the Junta de Andalucía spent a whopping sum of more than of 66,000 millions of euros.

The European Union allocates €366 billion a year to addressing gender violence. None of these grants are audited.

An estimation of the costs of gender violence in the EU, according to a study carried out by the United Kingdom, estimated that Spain received from more than 24,000 million euros in 2012. With these funds, networks of feminist associations related to political parties have been created, which obtain economic revenue through their gender ideology.

The Spanish gender violence law is based on author’s criminal law, as
stated on page 92 and 93 of the CGPJ’s, LIVG draft report and
Constitutional Court Judgment 59/2008, dated July 4. The Particular
vote of five magistrates, including Judge Jorge Rodríguez Zapata, states
in writing, on folio 25 of the sentences, that this law would make the
dreams of Edmund Mezger, German jurist from Nazi Germany, come true.

He writes in the seventh paragraph:

“Finally, I express my wish that this Judgment not to be the
beginning in our order of the fulfillment of Mezger’s dream: two
Criminal Laws; a criminal law for the generality, in which, in essence, the principles that have governed up to now will remain in force. And, along with it, a completely different criminal law, for special groups of certain people. I leave a record of my position in this Vote.
In Madrid, on May fourteenth, two thousand and eight. Jorge
Rodriguez Zapata Perez. -Signed”.

In addition to this, a renowned member of the Socialist party and expresident of the Spanish Government, Alfonso Guerra, publicly declared that he spoke with an acquaintance of his, who had been the president of the Constitutional Court in 2004, who confirmed to him that the seven magistrates who approved the unconstitutional law, that they did so under pressure from feminist lobbies, and from the socialist party of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero:

Alfonso Guerra reveals the pressure on the TC on the LIVG.

In Spain we are suffering from what Poland and Hungary already warned about, which is why they withdrew from the Istanbul Agreement.

If we add to this, that the socialist government subsidized women’s allegations with public money, since the higher the number of allegations, the more women are declared mistreated and the more
money the feminist associations receive. So says the BOE of 2005, Number 215 on page 30453.

Currently, in addition to all of the overhead, a lot of women in a divorce or children custody proceeding, profit from Articles 92.7 and 94 of the Civil Code. These women use the gender violence law so that fathers cannot fight for joint child custody. And with article 94, during the investigation and judicial process, the man is deprived of child visitation rights, despite the fact that 80% of them are eventually declared to be innocent. You can imagine the ordeal they suffer, when one to five years can pass without being able to see their children.

ANAVID asks that all of these discriminatory laws, which violate constitutional, fundamental and human rights, be repealed. These laws are destroying the lives of men, children, and entire families, and are not protecting the truly mistreated women. We demand laws that protect and punish all people equally, regardless of sex, age, ethnicity or sexual orientation.

Furthermore, we ask that any person declared innocent, that had been
deprived of their liberty to be compensated with €600 per day and for
those who have suffered a restraining order being found innocent, we ask for a compensation of €110 per day.

Note: The original Spanish version of this statement is available on the ANAVID website.

Domestic Violence Law & Justice Legal

Why Are Young Women Becoming More Violent?

Why Are Young Women Becoming More Violent?


December 28, 2022

These three stories about domestic assaults appeared in a single day on December 27, 2022:

  1. New Jersey woman allegedly shoots, kills husband on Christmas
  2. Florida mother stabs 3-year-old daughter to death: Police
  3. Woman arrested in South Carolina airport after attacking husband over ‘indecent’ photos on his phone: Police

Criminologists have known for more than 30 years that young women are rapidly becoming more violent. To illustrate the phenomenon, here’s a story from 2006, at which point the trend was already more than a decade old:

Are US Girls Becoming More Violent?

July 2006

Adolescent U.S. girls are being arrested in record numbers. … [N]ational arrest statistics for simple and aggravated assaults by girls have been on the rise for more than a decade. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports note the female percentage of total juvenile assault arrests jumped from 21 percent to 32 percent between 1990 and 2003. And the U.S. female juvenile assault rate rose from about 200 for every 100,000 girls to 750 between 1980 and 2003.

Some analysts trace the surge in the number of girls arrested to increased pressures—from the breakdowns of family, church, community, and school—that have increased their propensity for violence. Other analysts reason that girls are more likely to act out or lash out due to changing gender-role expectations: Greater female freedom and assertiveness have masculinized female behavior and are expressed in an imitation of male machismo competitiveness. And violence by girls is also pervasive in much of today’s entertainment. (Even in a recent Harry Potter movie, a girl character—Hermione Granger—hits a boy, only to say afterwards: “Boy, that felt good.”)

The trend is all the more remarkable because, until 2020, the crime rate for every other demographic group had been declining for more than 20 years. Young women were the only demographic group that showed an increase in violent crime. Here’s a story from early 2020:

Female fugitives: Why is ‘pink-collar crime’ on the rise?

The Guardian, Jan 6, 2020

Men commit more crimes than women do. A lot more. This holds true over time and across cultures. In America, the incarceration capital of the world (more than 2 million detainees), males comprise 93% of the prison population. Men also account for 73% of all arrests and 80% of those charged with violent crimes. This disparity between the sexes is particularly stark when it comes to murder: 90% of the time, the ones who do the killing are men.

All these numbers add up to what criminologists call the “gender gap”. But read enough academic journals and government crime reports, and some curious facts emerge: while crime rates in the western world have steadily declined over the past three decades, the number of young women being convicted for violent crimes in some western countries has increased significantly; law enforcement records indicate the opposite is true for their male counterparts. In other words, the gender gap is closing.

In some UK cities, the number of female arrests increased by 50% from 2015 to 2016. That’s more than a blip. A 2017 report by the Institute For Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London came up with this sobering data point: the global female prison population has surged by more than half since the turn of the century, while the male prison population increased by just a fifth over that same period. Women and girls may account for only 7% of all incarcerated people today, but their numbers are now growing at a much faster rate than at any time in recorded history.

Going Easy on Female Offenders

Criminologists advance several different theories for the increase in violent crime by young females, including the substantial disparity in criminal justice outcomes for women compared to men. Young female perpetrators understand they are much less likely to be prosecuted than similarly-situated male offenders. And, even if prosecuted, are likely to receive substantially lower sentences than similarly-situated male offenders. In other words, young women are becoming more violent, at least in part, because they believe they can get away with it.

Numerous studies confirm this sex bias. Here’s a small sample of these studies:

Sex bias in the criminal system arises from the actions of police officers, prosecutors, and judges, and well as from the misconceptions of lawmakers and the public at large. It’s time to stop these egregious violations of the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.



Domestic Violence Due Process False Allegations Law & Justice Legal

Families in Bermuda Are Being Harmed by the UN’s Domestic Violence Policies

Families in Bermuda Are Being Harmed by the UN’s Domestic Violence Policies

Edward M. Tavares

Co-founder, ChildWatch Bermuda

Bermuda is part of United Kingdom’s commonwealth as an overseas dependent territory. We are sharing our concerns about the status of shared parenting and domestic violence policies.

Shared Parenting

According to Bermuda’s last statistical family type release in May 31, 2006, 85% of custody of children post-divorce and separation was held by women. How can 85% of fathers be relegated to visitor status by the courts because their marriage failed? Most studies show these divorce decisions are made unilaterally by women.

Continuous violation exists with respect to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which states in Article 9:

  1. Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, and that
  2. Such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately, and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence.
  3. Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.

However, fathers have been relegated to visitor status for decades in regard to custody of their children after divorce or separation by the courts, most times without any investigations or due process. This can cause violations of the European Human Rights, Article 8 of the Convention– Right to respect for private and family life:

“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”

One father went to court for 28 years trying to obtain custody and to defend his parental rights. Meanwhile, he lost his house, bank accounts, etc., while having to obtain 14 lawyers and achieving little remedy in the court. This abuse of the law constitutes as legal administrative abuse and coercive control, requiring that the father must conform and comply with their demands.

The biases of the Courts and family Counsellors, Department of Child and Family Services, apparently see only mothers as viable caregivers. These injustices are usually compounded by many local organizations with the power of the Bermuda Police Services, while threatening and harassing letters are sent out without any investigations to many fathers to order them to conform to the demands which often are contrary to Court orders in place. We believe that these letters are just to gain higher status and finances, within society, and garner sympathy from politicians/legislators.

Prior to 2002 we had six men paying support for a child that was not theirs. We at ChildWatch advocated for legal changes as unwed fathers were not able to take proceedings against mothers, nor were allowed DNA testing for paternity fraud, according to “The Affiliation Act, 1976.”  One father found out that he wasn’t the father 17 years later, and a few others learned the truth 14 years later.

In 2006, one accused father was denied DNA testing even after it was implemented into law in 2002. The Judge refused DNA testing on the false claim of the mother that he was the father. After three years having gone to prison as ordered by the court, we lobbied to have him tested. Eventually this father was granted permission, and the results revealed that he was not the biological father. This ruined his life, having lost his job, and was considered unemployable, and unacceptable to society.

Many fathers suffer from not only losing their children, but also losing their homes and finances in the struggle for their children’s benefit.  Following a divorce, a parent may engage in behaviors that serve to alienate the child from the other parent. In an attempt to cover up the alienating behavior, the alienating parent may then falsely accuse the target parent of child abuse.

Bermuda’s prison inmates come largely from fatherless homes.  Poor education attainment, and dropping out, teen pregnancy, drug abuse, alcohol, behavioral problems, gang culture, and deaths by murder are more customary to male victims who come mostly from fatherless homes.

Policies of the United Nations 

The World Health Organization reports that men are far more likely to die of violence-related causes than women, for the following age groups (death rates 100,00 population):

• 5-14 years: Male: 1.7; Female: 1.0

• 15-24 years: Male: 57.7; Female: 8.1

• 25-34 years: Male: 92.3; Female: 10.3

• 35-54 years: Male: 70.6; Female: 6.5

• 55-74 years: Male: 29.5; Female: 3.3

Overall, the WHO reveals that men are eight times more likely than women to die of violence-related causes.

The UN report, “A Gendered Analysis of Violent Deaths”, similarly concluded, “Globally, men and boys accounted for 84 per cent of the people who died violently in 2010–15.” Clearly, violence against men represents a greater problem than violence against women.

Regarding domestic violence, a compilation of 343 scholarly investigations concluded that “women are as physically aggressive as men (or more) in their relationships with their spouses or opposite-sex partners.” These studies were conducted on a broad range of racial, ethnic, and socio-economic groups in 40 different countries.

ChildWatch Bermuda has great concerns regarding the UN Women’s position paper to “Eliminate Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls.” Our concern is that there is no mention of the “Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Men and Boys” included. Studies show that men suffer equally as women from domestic violence.

An analysis of Resolution A/77/302: Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women and Girls by the Domestic Abuse and Violence International Alliance on October 17, 2022 reveals substantial bias against male victims.

Domestic Violence During the COVID Pandemic

On March 23, 2020 the U.S.-based National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence issued an alert with this startling claim: “Survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault are facing extreme danger and risk.” Likewise, UN Women declared a “shadow pandemic of violence against women and girls” which would result from lockdowns across the world.

These alerts did not provide any evidence to support their claims. Subsequently, a wave of media accounts predicted an imminent “spike” and “spurt” of abuse, often featuring heart-rending — but unsubstantiated — anecdotes.

But the predicted catastrophe never happened. Numerous independent analyses of hotline calls, police calls for service, and crime statistics, both in the United States and abroad, concluded that overall, there was no increase in domestic violence or sexual assault, and some locales saw a decrease.

The U.S. National Domestic Violence Hotline reports on the number of answered calls, chats, and texts received each year since 1996. The graph from the most recent report reveals the number of answered inquiries in 2020 was 363,000, which is the same number as in 2018. Clearly, there was no “spike” or “surge” in the number of abuse calls during the COVID pandemic.

Imposed Separation Communication breakdowns are inherent in human relationships. In years past, police officers encouraged the parties to temporarily separate and make amends. But now, any marital tiff can be considered to be domestic “abuse.” Today, we have instituted mandatory-arrest laws, even when short-term separation and counseling for the parties would be the more appropriate measure.


These are just a few examples of the many injustices seen in Bermuda. We would like to thank you for taking the time to review and consider our concerns. Hopefully, we can reach a viable solution against domestic abuse for men and women, including boys and girls.

In addition, I will be happy to set up a telephone call to answer any questions you may have. Thank you for your attention to this matter of importance.



Campus False Allegations Law & Justice Sexual Assault Sexual Harassment Title IX

44 Judicial Decisions



April 29, 2022

Sex bias contravenes the very purpose of the Title IX law. Section 106.45: “A recipient’s treatment of a complainant or a respondent in response to a formal complaint of sexual harassment may constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under title IX.”

As of March 2022., eight appellate decisions and 36 trial court decisions have affirmed the necessity of avoiding sex bias in campus adjudications, relying upon Title IX statutory law to reach their conclusions. Two of the decisions also cited constitutional due process grounds: Doe v. University of Mississippi and Doe v. University of Oregon. Sex bias violative of Title IX can take the form of wrongful discipline or disparate treatment of male students as compared to female students.



Appellate Court Decisions

1. Doe v. Regents of the University of California (UCLA), No. 20-55831 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022) (reversing and vacating the order and judgment of the District Court of the Central District of California dismissing a Title IX action brought by Doe because Doe plausibly stated a Title IX claim against the Regents):
a. “[R]espondents in Title IX complaints that UCLA decided to pursue from July 2016 to June 2018 were overwhelmingly male (citing specific statistics for each of those years), and that the Regents doesn’t report by gender the percentage of respondents found to have violated campus policy. Doe also alleges that the University ‘has never suspended a female for two years based upon these same circumstances, nor [has it] used the reasoning that two years is a minimum suspension when issuing a suspension to a female … under these types of facts[.]’” Id. at *17.
b. “Jason Zeck, UCLA’s Respondent Coordinator, advised Doe in July 2017, during the pending Title IX investigation, that ‘no female has ever fabricated allegations against an ex-boyfriend in a Title IX setting.’ Mr. Zeck’s statement suggests that UCLA’s Title IX officials held biased assumptions against male respondents during the course of Doe’s disciplinary proceeding.” Id. at *19.
c. “Associate Dean Rush, the ultimate decisionmaker here, advised Doe that if she were in his shoes, she would have invited Roe into her office during the February 2017 incident. Associate Dean Rush’s comment suggests that she did not view Roe as an aggressor, and at the very least raises the question of whether, if the gender roles were reversed, Associate Dean Rush would have made the same recommendation to a female approached by her angry, male ex-fiancé́when he showed up unannounced to confront her at her place of employment.” Id. at *20.
d. “[T]he University demonstrated its disparate treatment of Doe as a male during its investigation by failing to investigate his claim that Roe was not a student at the time of the incident and not discrediting Roe when it became apparent that Roe had misrepresented her status as a student and falsely stated that she fractured a rib on February 13.” Id. at 20-21.

2. Doe v. University of Denver, 10th Cir. No. 19-1359, 2021 WL 2426199, at *11 (10th Cir. June 15, 2021) (reversing the district court’s order granting the University summary judgment because Doe satisfies the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test through a Title IX claim to overcome summary judgment): “[W]here there is a one-sided investigation plus some evidence that sex may have played a role in the school’s disciplinary decision, it should be up to a jury to determine whether the school’s bias was based on a protected trait or merely a non-protected trait that breaks down accross gender lines.”

3. Does 1-2 v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, No. 19-2552, 2021 WL 2197073, (8th Cir. June 1, 2021) (finding that the Does alleged a plausible Title IX claim of discrimination on the basis of sex):
a. “First, the Does allege that the University was biased against them because of external pressures from the campus community and the federal government over a perceived lack of diligence in investigating and expelling students accused of sexual assault. The Does allege that, in response to the football team’s boycott, various groups on campus urged officials to take a tougher stance against campus sexual misconduct which pressured University officials to corroborate Jane’s accusations. President Kaler’s public statements before the SSMS hearing further ‘poisoned the well’ and exacerbated biased attitudes towards male African-American athletes. Additional pressure came from past criticism of President Kaler and the University for an inept response to former A.D. Teague’s sexual harassment of multiple staff members. That these pressures influenced the University in this case can be inferred from A.D. Coyle’s comment that the players should be suspended when initially accused ‘because of optics.’” Id. at *4.
b. “Second, the Does allege historical facts that reinforce the inference of bias in this specific proceeding. In 2014, the OCR investigated the University for potential Title IX violations after charges were lodged that the University discriminated against female athletes by denying them equal funding and resources and by tolerating a male gymnastics coach’s sexual harassment of a female gymnast. The University settled the harassment charge by paying the female gymnast $250,000. It is ‘entirely plausible’ that the specter of another federal investigation of potential Title IX violations could motivate the University to discriminate against male athletes accused of sexual misconduct to demonstrate ongoing compliance with Title IX.” Id.
c. “It is alleged that investigator Marisam believed football players had covered up sexual misconduct complaints during a 2015 investigation, motivating her to punish as many players as possible in response to Jane’s accusations. After the 2015 investigation, Director Hewitt opined to Kaler and Teague that there was a ‘concerning pattern’ of behavior among the football team, and warned that the players posed an increased risk of committing sexual assault or harassment in the future. It is reasonable to infer that investigator Marisam was aware of and agreed with these sentiments. These allegations support the inference that the University, and specifically its investigators, discriminated against the Does on the basis of sex.” Id. at *5.

4. Schwake v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. July 29, 2020) (reversing district court’s dismissal of Title IX action for failure to state a claim): “Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decision-making against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make [inference of outside pressure] plausible. He alleged that ‘[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University] are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.’ Schwake further alleged that he was ‘aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.’ The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation … Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations … establish background indicia of sex discrimination”

5. Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir. June 29, 2020): (Reversing district court’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a Title IX claim): “Oberlin argues that, to show a ‘particularized causal connection’ between the flawed outcome and sex bias, Doe must identify some bias unique to his own proceeding. But that argument misreads our precedents. [The Sixth Circuit] has never held that, to be ‘particularized’ in this sense, the effects of the causal bias must be limited to the plaintiff’s own case. To the contrary, for example, we have held that ‘patterns of decision-making’ in the university’s cases can show the requisite connection between outcome and sex.”

6. Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. May 29, 2020): (holding sex was a motivating factor in decesion to investigate male student, thus warranting a Title IX claim): “Doe alleges that USciences ‘[e]ngaged in selective investigation and enforcement of [its] policies by failing to consider [Doe’s] alcohol consumption and whether [Roe] 2 should have been charged with violations of [the Policy] if [Doe] was intoxicated when they had sex[.]’ According to the investigator’s report, Roe 2 and Doe consumed between three and five drinks each. Doe further alleges that ‘[a]lthough both [he] and [Roe] 2 had been drinking [during the party], [USciences] identified [Doe] as the initiator of sexual activity, notwithstanding the comparable intoxication of’both participants.’”

7. Doe v. University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 865-66 (8th Cir. Sep. 4, 2020) (reversing the district court’s order dismissing Doe’s Title IX Claim): “External pressure on a university to demonstrate that it acted vigorously in response to complaints by female students may support an inference that a university is biased based on sex, although not necessarily in a particular case. Doe’s complaint alleges both: a dubious decision in his particular case taken against the backdrop of substantial pressure on the University to demonstrate that it was responsive to female complainants. The allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Title IX that is plausible on its face.”

8. Doe v. Columbia University, 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. July 29, 2016 (reversing the district court’s MTD because Doe has a plausible Title IX claim):
a. “Those alleged biased attitudes were, at least in part, adopted to refute criticisms circulating in the student body and in the public press that Columbia was turning a blind eye to female students’ charges of sexual assaults by male students.” Id. at 56.
b. “As outlined above, the Complaint alleges that during the period preceding the disciplinary hearing, there was substantial criticism of the University, both in the student body and in the public media, accusing the University of not taking seriously complaints of female students alleging sexual assault by male students. It alleges further that the University’s administration was cognizant of, and sensitive to, these criticisms, to the point that the President called a University-wide open meeting with the Dean to discuss the issue. Against this factual background, it is entirely plausible that the University’s decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the accusing female over the accused male[.]” Id. at 57.

Trial Court Decisions

1. Doe v. University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, no. 4:21-cv-01439, at *19-20 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2021) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly alleged a Title IX erroneous outcome claim against the university and a due process claim against the individual defendants): “[University of Texas (UT] Health presumed [Doe] to be ‘guilty from the start, as a male accused . . .’ there was gender bias[.]”

2. Doe v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, no. 6:20-cv-1220-WWB-LRH (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2021) (denying in part the university’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly presented Title IX selective enforcement and breach of contract violations):
a. “Most notably, in several instances [Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU)] . . .relied on unsubstantiated and gender biased assumptions that because Plaintiff became and maintained an arousal and ejaculated, he could not have been the victim of sexual misconduct or incapacitated at the time of the incident.” Id. at *11-12.
b. “Jane Roe expressed concerns about being ‘taken advantage of’ and Plaintiff’s failure to obtain consent for the sexual activity, but the report fails to note that Plaintiff also stated, unequivocally, that he did not want to have sex prior to the party and failed to provide any evidence that they ever asked Jane Roe if or how she obtained consent from Plaintiff. A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that ERAU operated under biased gender stereotypes regarding the role of males and females in giving and obtaining consent for sex.” Id. at *12.

3. Doe v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, No. 20-cv-02265-CSB-EIL (C.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2021) (text order denying defendant’s MTD plaintiff’s Title IX claim and due process claim without giving specific reasons): “Plaintiff has alleged ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief [for Title IX and due process violations] that is plausible on its face.

4. Moe v. Grinnell College, No. 4:20-cv-00058-RGE-SBJ (S.D. Iowa Aug. 23, 2021) (denying the college’s motion for summary judgment on Moe’s Title IX claim and breach of contract claim):
a. “In the 2015 case opinion [with similar facts to Moe’s case, but it was between two women], the adjudicator found both the female respondent and female complainant credible. Although the complainants in both cases indicated they had not consented to sexual intercourse, in the 2015 case opinion, the adjudicator did not address whether the initial sexual contact between the parties was consensual. The adjudicator considered whether the initial sexual contact between Moe and Complainant 1 was
consensual. Also, unlike Moe’s case, the adjudicator did not make findings regarding the
uncharged conduct of nonconsensual sexual contact in the 2015 case. Finally, in the 2015 case opinion, the adjudicator credited the female respondent’s testimony that the complainant ‘was an active participant in their sexual activities.’ The adjudicator did not credit similar testimony by Moe.” Id. at *22.
b. “In light of differential treatment between Moe and the female respondent identified
above, a jury could find the adjudicator’s assessment about Moe’s credibility was based on biased notions as to men’s sexual intent.” Id. at *23.
c. “The adjudicator relied in part on the inferences she drew about the intent behind Moe’s physical actions to assess his credibility. The adjudicator’s credibility finding then formed the basis for finding Moe responsible for violations alleged by Complainant 2 and Complainant 3 . . . a reasonable jury could determine the adjudicator’s inferences as to Moe were based on stereotypes about male sexual intent.” Id. at *24.

5. Doe v. Columbia University, Case 1:20-cv-06770-GHW (S.D.N.Y. Aug 1, 2021) (denying the University’s MTD Doe’s Title IX erroneous outcome claim in imposing interim suspension, Title IX
selective enforcement claim in the Jane Doe 1 proceeding, Title IX erroneous outcome claim in the Jane Doe 4 proceeding, and Title IX erroneous outcome claim in the Jane Doe 3 proceeding):
a. “[I]t is plausible that, as Plaintiff alleges, Columbia was sensitive to this criticism and that it was thus motivated to favor female complainants over a male respondent, to protect Columbia from further accusations that it had failed to protect female students from gender-based misconduct.” Id. at *47.
b. “[T]he publication of an article reporting that Plaintiff, a student government leader, was being investigated for Title IX violations and that one of the complaints against him had been made by a campus activist— plausibly support an inference that public pressure and criticism impacted the way Columbia treated male respondents in general and Plaintiff in particular, and motivated Columbia to treat Plaintiff more harshly.” Id. at *47-48.

6. Victim Rights Law Center v. Cardona, no. 1:20-cv-11104-WGY, at *38 (D. Mass. July 28, 2021) (affirming 12 of 13 challenged Department of Education’s 2020 Title IX Regulations based on Title IX statutory law): “The [Education] Department interpreted Title IX’s prohibited sex discrimination to encompass only (1) quid pro quo sexual conduct, (2) ‘[u]nwelcome conduct determined by a reasonable person to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity,’ and (3) ‘[s]exual assault . . . dating violence . . . domestic violence . . . and stalking,’ as defined in other provisions of the U.S. Code. Final Rule § 106.30.”

7. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., No. 4:18-CV-00268-SAL, 2021 WL 779144, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2021) (holding that Doe established a genuine issue of material fact as to sex bias by the University, warranting a Title IX claim): “Plaintiff argues University data in sexual misconduct cases demonstrates a pattern of bias against male respondents. From January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2016, there were eight sexual misconduct investigations, complaints, or cases that resulted in a Student Conduct Board Hearing. In all eight cases, the accused were males. There were three appeals from sexual misconduct cases during this time. Two males appealed, and one female appealed. Only the female’s appeal was granted.”

8. Doe v. American University, No. 19-CV-03097 (APM), 2020 WL 5593909, at *8 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 2020) (denying the university’s MTD under Title IX and breach of contract grounds): “The italicized statement begs an obvious question: Why was it ‘important’ for [the investigator] to ‘note’ that H.S.’s information came from Doe and not Roe or C.G.? Quasem offers no explanation. Her statement plausibly could be read to discount H.S.’s reporting merely because it came from an accused male, as opposed to a female accuser and her female roommate. Thus, it is evidence of plausible gender bias.”

9. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 464 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Ind. June 1, 2020) (finding that Purdue discriminated against Doe on the basis of sex, thus violating Title IX):
a. “Furthermore, as in John Doe v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652, 668–70 (7th Cir. 2019), the Defendants were under immense pressure because of (1) various lawsuits filed by female students against Purdue University for its handling of allegations of sexual assault perpetrated by male students; (2) the negative media publicity regarding the lawsuits and the number of sexual assaults on campus; (3) various campus protests; and (4) the financial pressure caused by the Office of Civil Rights’ investigations. Such pressure explains why the Defendants may have been motivated to discriminate against male students on the basis of gender.” Id. at 1008.
b. “Furthermore, during the disciplinary proceedings, Defendant Sermersheim posed questions and made comments based upon sex-based stereotypes. Likewise, a panel member also made comments based upon sex-based stereotypes. Such gender-based stereotyping allows a reasonable inference that the ‘defendants acted with a nefarious discriminatory purpose and discriminated against him based on his membership in a definable class.’” Id.

10. Doe v. Colgate Univ., 457 F. Supp. 3d 164 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (Denying University’s motion for summary judgement as to Doe’s Title IX claims):
a. “Plaintiff points out … that there is a direct comparator to his case in that a female respondent was found responsible in February 2018 for non-consensual sexual contact and sexual harassment. That female respondent was issued a two-year suspension, thus permitting her to return as a student upon completion of the suspension. Plaintiff asserts that, although ‘non-consensual sexual contact’ and ‘non-consensual sexual intercourse’ are both defined as ‘Sexual Assault’ under Defendant’s [Title IX] policy, Plaintiff, as a male respondent, was assessed a much more severe punishment than the female respondent.” Id. at 173-74.
b. “Dean [of Conduct for Colgate] noted that Defendant ‘generally regard[s] sexual offenses as being on a continuum of gravity[.]’ She attempted to distinguish the female respondent’s case by explaining, ‘[t]hat case did not involve penetration of any kind and therefore did not constitute non-consensual sexual intercourse within the definition of [University’s Title IX] policy.’ In fact … Defendant has not had a single case where a female has been accused of non-consensual penetration of any kind or where a male has claimed to be the victim of non-consensual penetration of any kind.
i. Plaintiff, however, was found responsible for non-consensual sexual intercourse because he was found to have ‘penetrated [Roe]’s vagina with [his] penis at a time when she was asleep and, therefore, unable to give affirmative consent…’
Due to biological differences between men and women, a female respondent could never be found responsible for this exact conduct. Thus, for purposes of Title IX selective enforcement litigation, the female respondent is a direct comparator to Plaintiff because they both were found responsible for ‘Sexual Assault’ under the [University Title IX policy’s] definition. When considering the
female respondent as a direct comparator, Plaintiff and she should have been assessed similar or equal penalties. Instead, the Hearing and Appeal Panelists assessed upon Plaintiff the harshest penalty of expulsion, meaning he could never return to Defendant’s university and he would have to disclose his expulsion when applying to attend other schools. The female respondent, however, could ultimately return as a student after two years.”

11. Doe v. Syracuse University, 457 F. Supp. 3d 178 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (denying Syracuse’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Title IX selective enforcement):
a. “The Plaintiff first argues that he and Jane Roe engaged in ‘the exact same sexual conduct.’ Since they both admitted to drinking, they had both had sexual contact with a person incapable of consent, and both should have received the same sanction. Jane Roe was not even investigated for violating the sexual misconduct policy. Id. at 195.
b. “[T]here are questions of fact about whether gender bias motivated the fact that Plaintiff received a penalty for the incident and Jane Roe did not.” Id. at 200.

12. Feibleman v. Trustees of Columbia University in City of New York, No. 19-CV-4327 (VEC), 2020WL 882429, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020) (denying the university’s MTD on Title IX and breach of contract grounds): “Here, Feibleman alleges that Columbia and its investigators were under similar pressure throughout his investigation, hearing, and appeal process. Two weeks after Doe complained of sexual assault, Barnett and other investigators assigned to the case became the subject of a Department of Education investigation into their alleged refusal to investigate a sexual assault case initiated by a female student . . . [f]urthermore, during the pendency of Feibleman’s appeal, Columbia allegedly received weeks of negative press coverage for settling a court case with a male student who had been accused of rape in a high-profile case . . . [b]ased on those allegations, consistent with the holding in Doe, Plaintiff has provided a plausible motivation on the part of Columbia to discriminate against male students accused of sexual assault.”

13. Doe v. Syracuse University., 440 F. Supp. 3d 158, 168 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (holding that Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate notice, which violates plaintiff’s due process):
“On January 25, 2017, the day after OCR came to campus, ‘Syracuse initiated its Title IX Complaint against [Plaintiff].’ The complaint was brought by Syracuse, not RP. Plaintiff alleges that Syracuse initiated this complaint, over two months after the report by RP, and over a month after the SPD had closed its investigation ‘in response to public and governmental pressure to extirpate the so-called ‘rape culture’ among Syracuse male students.’”

14. Doe v. University of Maine System, no. 1:19-cv-00415-NT (D. Me. Feb. 20, 2020) (denying the
university’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly claim Title IX violations and a procedural due process violation):
a. “There may be an argument that Doe’s report of these details—which occurred after the
Settlement Agreement—was a new starting point for assessing how [the University of Maine System (UMS)] responded to his allegations. If so, any failure by UMS to investigate those allegations, while actively investigating the complaints against Doe, could potentially be a new act of selective enforcement or could have contributed to a hostile environment for Doe.” Id. at *17.
b. “The Plaintiff alleges that UMS had a ‘retaliatory motive’ when it took several adverse actions against him. See Compl. ¶¶ 137–43. Those adverse actions appear to be complete. See Compl. ¶ 140 (actions include barring Doe from his employment, suspending Doe, making public statements about Doe’s Title IX case, providing Doe’s Title IX case files to the press and others, and failing to disclose that Doe’s disciplinary proceedings had been dismissed for exculpatory reasons).” Id. at *26.

15. Unknown Party v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. CV-18-01623-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL 7282027, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 2019) (holding Doe’s hearing contained plausible evidence of sex bias, warranting a Title IX claim): “In May 2014, as part of an effort to follow-up on the issuance of the ‘Dear Colleague’ letter, OCR published a list of 55 universities that were under investigation for Title IX violations. ASU was one of the universities named on this list. OCR officials visited ASU in 2012 and 2013 to ‘gather information’ about ASU’s processes for investigating sexual assault complaints. Following these visits, ASU was ‘subjected to extraordinary pressure,’ including two additional OCR complaints ‘that were filed as [Doe’s] case was ongoing.’”

16. Overdam v. Texas A&M University, No. 4:18-cv–02011, at *4 (S.D. Texas Nov. 5, 2019) (denying the university’s MTD Overdam’s Title IX selective enforcement claim): “[The University] creates an environment in which male students accused of sexual misconduct are nearly assured of a finding of responsibility. This environment denies the accused his fundamental due process rights and deprives these male students of educational opportunities solely on the basis of their sex.”

17. Doe v. Grinnell College, 473 F. Supp. 3d 909 (S.D. Iowa July 9, 2019) (denying defendant’s MSJ on Doe’s Title IX and breach of contract claims):
a. “Doe claims the determination in Complainant #1’s case arbitrarily found Complainant
#1’s side of the story more credible and made unwarranted assumptions about
Complainant #1 being naïve and sexually inexperienced.” Id. at 927.
b. “The Court concludes Doe has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could deduce the determinations of responsibility relied upon by Grinnell to dismiss Doe were based on a biased perspective regarding the behavior of women during sexual
encounters.” Id.
c. “The analysis in the determination of responsibility in the 2015 case, which found a female respondent responsible for sexual misconduct, supports Doe’s assertion that there is a dispute regarding the impact of gender bias on Doe’s disciplinary proceeding.
The 2015 determination of responsibility, like the determination in Doe’s case, considers evidence of two conflicting accounts of a sexual encounter. The 2015 determination of responsibility notes the female respondent believed she had consent for sexual conduct with the complainant, also female, who reported she was trying to sleep when the respondent digitally penetrated her vagina. That determination ultimately concluded the sexual intercourse was non consensual and recommended a sanction for the respondent.” Id. at 929.

18. Oliver v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical School, no. 3:18-cv-01549-B, at *39 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2019) (denying the university’s motion to dismiss because Oliver plausibly claimed Title IX and due process violations): “It could very well be that [the University] considered [Oliver’s] defenses; however, the lack of any record or mention of them in the expulsion letter or the hearing supports a claim, at this stage, that Oliver’s gender was a motivating factor in this erroneous outcome. This inference of gender bias in the erroneous outcome is further exacerbated by the fact that Oliver was never given access to the incriminating evidence against him nor was Rowan required to testify against him at trial, which significantly limited his ability to mount a viable defense.”

19. Doe v. University of Mississippi, 361 F.Supp.3d 597 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 16, 2019) (holding that Doe had raised plausible claims of sex bias and due process violations):
a. “Doe argues that Defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause by disciplining him for engaging in sexual intercourse with Roe while she was under the influence of alcohol but failing to discipline Roe for engaging in sexual intercourse with
him.” Id. at 614.
b. “As it is, Doe has alleged that he and Roe drank together at his fraternity party; that Roe reported to her doctor that she and Doe ‘were both drunk and that she felt it was a mutual decision between both of them’ to have sex; and that the University pursued disciplinary action against him but not Roe.” Id. at 615.

20. Doe v. Rollins College, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1205 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2019) (denying the university’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly alleged college acted out of gender bias, violating Title IX, and college violated various provisions in sexual misconduct policy, warranting breach of contract):
a. “Rollins [College] investigated Plaintiff’s claims amidst a clamor of public and campus scrutiny over its treatment of sexual assault complaints by female students. Alone, allegations of external pressure fail to support an inference of gender discrimination. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018). Yet Plaintiff has also pointed to the negative attention Rollins received after Mancini [a Rollins College Title IX case] that caused it to buckle down in support of its policies, along with circumstantial evidence of bias in Plaintiff’s specific proceeding. Thus, taking Plaintiff’s allegations of external pressure from increased public scrutiny with the Mancini litigation and the particular circumstances of Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim plausible.” Id. at 1210-11.
b. “[T]he information Rollins collected during the investigation could have equally supported disciplinary proceedings against Jane Roe for also violating the Sexual Misconduct Policy. Yet Rollins treated Jane Roe—a female student—differently.” Id. at 1211.

21. Rossley v. Drake University, 342 F. Supp. 3d 904, 946 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 12, 2018) (denying in part the university’s motion for summary judgment because there was an genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and Title IX claim under the selective enforcement theory): “[The University] Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to the alleged breaches of contract that Defendants failed to conduct an equitable investigation of Plaintiff’s claim and Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of sex.”

22. Doe v. Syracuse University, 341 F. Supp. 3d 125, 138 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2018) (denying the university’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly stated a Title IX claim under the erroneous outcome theory and a Title IX claim under the selective enforcement theory): · “Doe, like the plaintiffs in Columbia University and Rolph, has coupled his factual allegations with the allegations of public pressure on [Syracuse] University to more aggressively prosecute sexual abuse allegations. Like in these other cases, Doe’s disciplinary proceeding occurred in the context of public criticism of the University’s handling of sexual abuse complaints against males. A reasonable inference could be drawn that the Investigator, the University Conduct Board, the Appeals Board, and the University official who ultimately decided the appeal were ‘motivated to refute [public] criticisms [of Syracuse’s handling of sexual abuse allegations] by siding with the accusing female and against the accused male.’”

23. Doe v. Brown University, 327 F. Supp. 3d 397 (D.R.I. Aug. 27, 2018) (denying in part the university’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly stated a Title IX selective enforcement
claim, a Title IX deliberately indifference claim, a Title VI racial discrimination claim, a gender discrimination claim under a Rhode Island state statute, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim):
a. “John [Doe] alleges sufficient plausible facts that, if proven, could lead a jury to find that Brown [University] was deliberately indifferent to known harassment so that its response to that harassment was unreasonable. For example, he alleges that both he and Jane [Roe, the accuser,] reported the other to Brown for sexual assault occurring from their alley encounter, but Brown chose to pursue disciplinary action against John while failing to bring any charges against Jane.” Id. at 411.
b. “Because the decision to launch the second investigation [into sexual assault], and the decision to separate, were directly related to the first investigation, John [Doe] plausibly alleges that those decisions were affected by his gender.” Id. at 412.
c. “Both John [Doe] and Jane [Roe, the accuser,] were students at Brown [University]. Both brought complaints of sexual assault. Both complaints of sexual assault occurred, at most, within six months of each other. Brown investigated Jane’s complaint; it ignored John’s complaint. While the two are not exactly identical,11 the allegations as pleaded present John and Jane as similarly situated.” Id. at 412-13.

24. Doe v. University of Oregon, No. 6:17-CV-01103-AA, 2018 WL 1474531, at *15 (D. Or. Mar. 26, 2018) (denying defendant’s MTD regarding Doe’s due process claim and 14th Amendment equal protection claim): “But another plausible inference from the complaint is that the University was predisposed to believe Roe because she is a woman and disbelieve plaintiff because he is a man. That inference could be supported by, among other things, evidence that when the accused is a woman and/or when the accuser is a man, the University conducts sexual misconduct investigations and adjudications differently than it did in this case.”

25. Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 585 (E.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2018) (finding that Doe established a likelihood of sex bias in his hearing and therefore substantiated a Title IX claim): “Doe raises many allegations which he believes demonstrate Marymount’s gender bias. But one particular allegation is noteworthy because, if accepted as true, it reveals that Doe’s adjudicator, Professor Lavanty, adhered to certain gendered beliefs. Specifically, Doe alleges that in a subsequent sexual assault investigation at Marymount, a male student accused a female student of touching his genitals without his consent and of pushing his hand into her genitals without his consent. Professor Lavanty served as the investigator in that case and allegedly asked the male student ‘were you aroused’ by this unwanted touching? When the student responded, ‘no,’ Lavanty, in apparent disbelief, allegedly asked the male student again, ‘not at all?’ This unpleasant exchange between Lavanty and another male student at Marymount, a fact which must be accepted as true at this stage, reveals that Lavanty’s decision-making was infected with impermissible gender bias, namely Lavanty’s discriminatory view that males will always enjoy sexual contact even when that contact is not consensual. Because Lavanty served as Doe’s adjudicator and was ultimately responsible for determining Doe’s guilt or innocence, any evidence of Lavanty’s gender bias is particularly probative. If Lavanty possessed the outdated and discriminatory views of gender and sexuality alleged in Doe’s Complaint, these views would have naturally infected the outcome of Doe’s Title IX disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, this allegation alone is sufficient to satisfy Doe’s burden to plead a fact that creates an inference of gender discrimination in Marymount’s disciplinary proceedings.”

26. Doe v. University of Chicago, 1:16-cv-08298 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 20, 2017) (denying the University’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausibly claimed Title IX and intentional infliction of emotional
distress violations):
a. “If [the University’s Dean of Students] Inabinet intentionally encouraged Jane Doe to file a false complaint—that is, he knew or believed that her complaint was false and encouraged her to file it anyway—then it is plausible that Inabinet did so based on gender bias. The plausibility is reinforced by another allegation: as noted earlier, on August 5, 2016, John Doe and Inabinet discussed the complaints on a phone call.” Id. at *12.
b. “It is plausible to expect that Inabinet, if he were treating both genders alike, would have answered directly (and would have answered that the situations would be treated the same regardless of gender).” Id.

27. Doe v. Case W. Rsrv. Univ., No. 1:17 CV 414, 2017 WL 3840418, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017) (holding that Doe had raised a plausible claim of sex bias warranting a Title IX claim): “Here Plaintiff has alleged that the Deputy Title IX Coordinator Ms. Milliken, who was the person to investigate the complaint, prepare the evidentiary report, and testified at the hearing was biased against men and or considered them the sexual aggressor based upon statements made in her recent doctoral dissertation. He also alleged that sexual misconduct complaints more than doubled during Ms. Milliken’s tenure as Deputy Title IX Coordinator. Making all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, these allegations at least give rise to the possibility that Ms. Milliken had a bias against men in these types of situations, and while she was not the decision maker in this instance, she exercised enormous influence over the record and evidence presented to the decision maker.”

28. Doe v. Ohio State University, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2017) (denying defendant’s MTD plaintiff’s claim of a Title IX erroneous outcome):
a. “Plaintiff counters that indirect/circumstantial evidence of gender bias can trigger Title IX liability, including that pressure from the executive branch of the Federal government motivated the discipline of John Doe. In support of this, Plaintiff offers the temporal connection between the United States Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”)’s investigation of OSU and OSU’s investigation of John Doe. (Doc. 40, Pl.’s Resp. at 7). OSU ultimately entered into a settlement with OCR and documentation relating to
this settlement states that “since 2013, OSU had permanently expelled every student found guilty of sexual assault” and that “[u]pon information and belief, all of these students were male.” (Id. at 8, (citing Doc. 36, Am. Compl. ¶ 25).” Id. at 1070.23
b. “OSU has affirmatively stated that it promises to continue to aggressively discipline malestudents accused of sexual misconduct with no reassurance of ensuring fairness and due process in the disciplinary process.” Id. at 1072.

29. Doe v. Amherst College, no. 3:15-cv-30097-MGM (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2017) (denying the university’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because Doe plausibly stated breach of contract, national origin discrimination, and Title IX violations):
a. “[Amherst] College took proactive steps to encourage [the accuser] Jones to file a formal complaint against Doe when it learned he may have been subjected her to nonconsensual sexual activity. But, when the College learned Jones may have initiated sexual activity with Doe while he was ‘blacked out,’ and thus incapable of consenting, the College did not encourage him to file a complaint, consider the information, or otherwise investigate. Doe also alleges the severity of his punishment was due to his gender because the College intended his punishment to appease campus activists who sought the expulsion of a male student. These factual allegations are sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Id. at *37
b. “[W]hile Doe never filed a formal complaint, [Amherst] College certainly learned that [the accuser] Jones may have engaged in sexual activity with Doe while he was “blacked out” and yet, Doe asserts, the College did not take even minimal steps to determine whether Doe should have been viewed as a victim under the terms of the [the sexual misconduct] Policy . . . [thus warranting a claim for deliberate indifference under Title IX].” Id.

30. Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2017) (holding that the proceedings held against Doe violated Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
a. “Plaintiff cites a news media report that school security chose not to press charges against a young male perpetrator accused of having sexually harassed four female students on Lynn University’s campus during February 2015, despite the fact that two of the female students desired to do so. Plaintiff contends that the news media report generated pressure from the parents of Defendant’s female students and from the public in Boca Raton for Defendant to take ‘action against the next male student accused of sexual battery by a female student.’ Plaintiff was the first male student against whom a sexual assault complaint was filed during the 2015–2016 school year.” Id. at 1340-42.
b. “Plaintiff has also alleged that Defendant’s administrators were cognizant of that pressure from both the public and the parents of female students. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that ‘[a]s a result, Lynn administrators were instructed to take a hard line toward
male students accused of sexual battery by female students, while not prosecuting any female students for similar alleged offenses.’ Plaintiff also puts forward the fact that in April 2015 Defendant curated a sexual assault awareness month that included ‘dedicated demonstrations to honor a female who was raped by a male instructor[,] who was found not guilty because of her choices in clothing.’” Id.

31. Ritter v. Oklahoma City Univ., W.D. Okla. No. CIV-16-0438-HE, 2016 WL 3982554, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 22, 2016) (denying MTD for failure to state a Title IX claim): “[C]onsidering all the 24 allegations in the amended complaint, including the asserted facts underlying plaintiff’s alleged offense, the alleged manner in which the investigation and disciplinary process were conducted, the allegation that females facing comparable disciplinary charges have been treated more favorably than plaintiff and the assertion that, because of his gender, the sanctions imposed on plaintiff were disproportionate to the severity of the charges levied against him, the court concludes plaintiff has stated a selective enforcement claim.”

32. Marshall v. Indiana University, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2016) (denying MTD under Title IX action):
a. “[O]n September 22, 2014, Marshall met with Ms. Hinton and informed her that he too had been sexually assaulted by another female student. (Filing No. 1–1 at 5.) However, the Defendants never investigated Marshall’s reported sexual assault. Id. at 1204.
b. “[T]he Defendants cannot credibly argue that the issue of intentional gender discrimination is not factually alleged by Marshall’s assertion of selective, gender-based enforcement against Marshall personally.” Id. at 1210.

33. Doe v. Brown University, 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D.R.I. Feb. 22, 2016) (denying Brown’s MTD under Title IX and breach of contract): “Requiring that a male student conclusively demonstrate, at the pleading stage, with statistical evidence and/or data analysis that female students accused of sexual assault were treated differently, is both practically impossible and inconsistent with the standard used in other discrimination contexts.”

34. Doe v. Washington & Lee Univ., W.D. Va. No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *10 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (denying MTD for failure to state a Title IX claim): “[G]ender bias could be inferred from [Title IX Officer]’s alleged October 5, 2014 presentation, wherein she introduced and endorsed the article, Is It Possible That There Is Something In Between Consensual Sex And Rape… And That It Happens To Almost Every Girl Out There? That article, written for the female-focused website Total Sorority Move, details a consensual sexual encounter between a man and the female author of the article, who comes to regret the incident when she awakens
the next morning. As Plaintiff describes it, the article posits that sexual assault occurs whenever a woman has consensual sex with a man and regrets it because she had internal reservations that she did not outwardly express. This presentation is particularly significant because of the parallels of the situation it describes and the circumstances under which Plaintiff was found responsible for sexual misconduct. Bias on the part of [Title IX Officer] is material to the outcome of John Doe’s disciplinary hearing due to the considerable influence she appears to have wielded in those proceedings.”

35. Doe v. Salisbury University, no. 1:14-cv-03853-JKB, at *10-11 (D. Md. June 2, 2015) (denying in part the university’s motion to dismiss because Doe plausible alleged retaliation in violation of Title IX): “Defendants chose to investigate the [alleged] 2012 [sexual assault] Incident because of Plaintiff’s prior Title IX complaints [against the university and its employees]. Such factual allegations include: Defendants had been aware of the 2012 Incident since May 2012, but the Office of Institutional Equity did not investigate until soon after Plaintiff filed his Title IX complaints, Defendants launched their investigation without any input from the alleged victim of 25 the 2012 Incident (Id. ¶ 20), and no criminal charges were ever filed against Plaintiff for the 2012

36. Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 747 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2014) (holding that Wells pled viable claims of libel and a Title IX violation): “Plaintiff alleges the allegations against him came within the context of Xavier’s recent mishandling of sexual assault allegations that triggered an investigation in January 2012 by the United States Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights. OCR’s investigation focused on the allegation that Xavier allowed a male student accused of sexual assault of two women to remain on campus. In February, OCR opened yet another investigation with regard to a third alleged sexual assault case Ultimately Xavier and OCR entered into an agreement so as to establish training and reporting programs to address sexual assault and harassment on campus.”


Child Custody Domestic Violence False Allegations Law & Justice Sexual Assault

Family Courts Increasingly Are Holding False Accusers Accountable for Their Actions

Family Courts Increasingly Are Holding False Accusers Accountable for Their Actions


April 1, 2022

Over the years, people have asked how to seek recompense for false allegations and other abusive litigation tactics.  Family law cases have a tendency to bring out bad behavior in people, and false allegations have an unfortunate tendency to arise with greater frequency in such cases.

Following are examples of three family law cases:

  1. In Leisinger v. Jacobson, 2002 SD 108 (S.D. 2002), a South Dakota man sued his ex-wife for making a series of false allegations during the pendency of their divorce. Among other things, she “orchestrated [a] protection order, and violations of it, to obtain leverage against him in the divorce.” The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a malicious prosecution verdict in which a jury ordered the ex-wife to pay $13,754 in damages to her ex-husband.  The jury also ordered her to pay $120,000 in punitive damages, which the Supreme Court reduced to $25,000.
  2. In a 2010 case titled Bloch v. Bloch, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a trial order that dismissed a malicious prosecution case that was based on false allegations made during a divorce. During the divorce case, the wife sought full custody of the couple’s minor child. Wife made false reports of physical abuse by him and reported or caused to be reported a number of false allegations of sexual abuse by the husband against the couple’s child. These allegations resulted in two separate child protective service (CPS) investigations, a psychological review of the parties and the child, and a number of police investigations. Husband was also forced to undergo a psychological evaluation, a polygraph examination, and was subject to at least one arrest. During the divorce proceedings, the trial court found the allegations were without merit, a finding supported by the psychologist who examined the parties and the child. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals allowed the husband’s malicious prosecution case against his ex-wife to proceed.
  3. In Norberg v. Norberg, 2017 ND 14 (N.D. 2017), the North Dakota Supreme Court allowed a case to proceed against a woman who falsely accused her husband of sexual assault in an effort to win custody of their children. The false allegations resulted in her husband being tried and acquitted of rape.

The North Dakota Supreme Court earlier affirmed a trial decision that awarded sole custody of the couple’s children to the falsely accused ex-husband. The trial court found the wife’s report of sexual abuse was untrue and nothing more than her attempt to get custody of the parties’ children.  The court also found that she lied to the children about her allegations, which alienated the children from their father and may have damaged his relationship with them. The court found her lies were strong evidence of her moral unfitness because the children had to deal with news accounts of their father’s criminal trial and the intrusions of supervised parenting time, and the lies put their father at risk of going to prison:

Malicious Prosecution

The family law cases discussed above all involved false allegations of rape and/or child abuse, which resulted in criminal investigations. It’s hard to image a more malicious act than to falsely accuse someone of rape or child abuse.

That said, malicious prosecution claims should only be brought in egregious situations – those that involve malice.  Malicious prosecution claims are generally disfavored in the law because of their potential chilling effect on people’s willingness to bring legitimate claims. Trial lawyers David Parker and William Mills write:

Malicious prosecution claims have long been recognized as having a chilling effect on an ordinary citizen’s willingness to bring a dispute to court, and as a result the tort is often characterized as a “disfavored cause of action.”

It is not simply a matter of a chilling effect on the public – it affects lawyers as well. “[T]here is a basic and important policy that public access to the courts should be unfettered by threats of retaliatory litigation. Access to the courts would be illusory if plaintiffs were denied counsel of their choice, because attorneys feared being held liable as insurers of the quality of their clients’ cases. Few attorneys would be willing to prosecute close and difficult matters, and virtually none would dare challenge the propriety of established legal doctrines.”  (citations omitted)


What are the takeaways from these cases for both lawyers and parties?

For lawyers, the takeaway is “do your diligence.”  Don’t merely repeat what your client tells you.  This is true at the start of the case as well as at all times during the pendency of the case.  If you learn during the pendency of the case that your allegations are false or unfounded, don’t repeat them.

Above all, don’t make unfounded allegations in an attempt to gain leverage.  If you allege child abuse or domestic violence in an effort to bolster your case and lose, you’ll certainly lose credibility with the court.  You might also find yourself a defendant in a malicious prosecution case.

For parties, don’t make unfounded allegations in an attempt to gain leverage.  For many years, this was considered a low-risk strategy – the so-called “silver bullet.”  However, things have changed.  These unsavory tactics not only are increasingly unlikely to carry the day, they may backfire and cause you to lose the case.  Even worse, you might get sued by your former partner after the case is over.

Campus Due Process False Allegations Law & Justice Sexual Assault Sexual Harassment

Cases Where Courts Have Reinstated Students Through Injunctive Relief

Listing of Cases Where Courts Have Reinstated Students Through Injunctive Relief

In his Memorandum in support of John Stiles’ Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief, attorney Richard Ratcliffe of Providence, RI listed 22 previous cases where courts reinstated accused students at universities through injunctive relief. [1]

These cases are listed here for the benefit of other attorneys who represent accused students:

  1. Paradise v. Brown University, No. 1:21-cv-00057 (D.R.I. Feb. 5, 2021), ECF 8
  2. Doe v. Brown University, No. 1:16-cv-00017 (D.R.I. Aug. 23, 2016), ECF 57
  3. Doe v. Texas A&M University-Kingsville, No. 2:21-cv-00257 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2021), ECF No. 18
  4. Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2020 WL 6118492, at 13 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2020)
  5. Doe v. University of Connecticut, 2020 WL 406356, at 2 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2020)
  6. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 2019 WL 2718496, at 6 (W.D. Va. June 28, 2019)
  7. Doe v. Rhodes College, No. 2:19-cv-02336 (W.D. Tenn. June 14, 2019), ECF 33
  8. Doe v. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 2:18-cv-00153 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2018), ECF 35
  9. Doe v. University of Michigan,325 F. Supp. 3d 821, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
  10. Roe v. Adams-Gaston, 2018 WL 5306768, at 14 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2018)
  11. Elmore v. Bellarmine University, 2018 WL 1542140, at 7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2018)
  12. Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017)
  13. Richmond v. Youngstown State University, 2017 WL 6502833, at 1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2017)
  14. Noakes v. Miami University, 2017 WL 3674910, at 13 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2017)
  15. Doe v. Pennsylvania State University, 276 F. Supp. 3d 300, 314 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2017)
  16. Doe v. University of Notre Dame, 2017 WL 1836939, at 12 (N.D. Ind. May 8, 2017)
  17. Ritter v. State of Oklahoma, 2016 WL 2659620, at 3 (W.D. Okla. May 6, 2016)
  18. Doe v. Pennsylvania State University, No. 4:15-cv-02072 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2015), ECF No. 12
  19. Doe v. Middlebury College, 2015 WL 5488109, at 3 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2015)
  20. King v. DePauw University, 2014 WL 4197507, at 13 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2014)
  21. Doe v. George Washington University, No. 1:11-cv-00696-RLW (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), ECF No. 8
  22. Coulter v. East Stroudsburg University, 2010 WL 1816632, at 3 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2010)

In response, Judge Mary McElroy of the District Court of Rhode Island granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Brown University from suspending an accused student during the pendency of his Title IX investigation. [2]

Addendum: Subsequent to the posting of this article, SAVE learned of another similar case:

  • Doe v. Weill Cornell Medical College of Cornell Univ. No. 16 cv 03531, (SDNY, May 20, 2016), which involved a medical student just weeks before graduation.  The case was under seal for the hearing, but it was later unsealed.  There was no published opinion.


[1] Stiles v. Brown University, No. 1:21-cv-00497 (D.R.I. Jan. 18, 2022), ECF No. 25 at *9-11.

[2] Peter Swope (January 28, 2022). Suspended athletes facing sexual assault allegations sue University.

Campus Due Process Free Speech Law & Justice Victims

Abolish the Constitution? College Administrators Need to Shore Up Due Process and Free Speech, Or Face Dire Consequences


Rebecca Stewart: 513-479-3335


Abolish the Constitution? College Administrators Need to Shore Up Due Process and Free Speech, Or Face Dire Consequences

WASHINGTON / December 14, 2021 – Students at Yale University (1) and the University of Florida (2) have signed petitions calling for the “abolition” of the United States Constitution. Students explained their support for the petition by saying, “There are a lot of outdated things in there that nowadays aren’t accepted” and the Constitution “wasn’t written for the 21st century.”

The petitions highlight an erosion of support for bedrock constitutional protections such as due process. As a result, administrators are seeing an increase in campus vigilantism, which ignores the presumption of innocence for the accused. Following are three recent cases:

  • A former student at SUNY-Purchase filed a lawsuit against the college, charging the school failed to protect him from student harassment over an alleged sexual assault incident (3).
  • Last month a group of Syracuse University protesters swarmed the front of a college fraternity, chanting the name of an alleged offender and demanding, “Kick him out, kick him out. ‘Alleged’ my ass, ‘alleged’ my ass.” (4)
  • At the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, the student newspaper ran an article describing three male students as “admitted rapists,” despite the fact that the three had won their Title IX case and the local prosecutor declined to press charges. As a result, the institution agreed to pay $450,000 in response to a defamation lawsuit (5).

Free speech is also under attack.

A recent survey of students at 159 leading colleges conducted by College Pulse, FIRE, and RealClear Education reveals that only 16% of institutions received a “Green” rating, meaning that institutional policies “do not seriously threaten speech.” (6) One student at Arizona State University confided, “As an English major, just about every class I’ve taken has touched on the ‘dangers’ of white people and whiteness….As a student, I don’t feel comfortable calling this what it is: a racist ideology.”

Faculty members are seeing a curtailment of their free speech rights as well, giving rise to groups such as the Alumni Free Speech Alliance (7) and Princetonians for Free Speech (8).

Due process and free speech are bulwarks of a democratic and free society. College administrators who acquiesce to campus activists are likely to face dire consequences including continued declines in student enrollments (9), shrinking budget allocations (10), decreased alumni contributions (11), and costly lawsuits (12).


Department of Justice Investigations Law & Justice Law Enforcement Sexual Assault Sexual Harassment Start By Believing Trauma Informed

EVAWI Announces End of DOJ Funding for ‘Start By Believing’

Registration Fee Now Required for Webinars:
All 2021 Virtual Conference Sessions Available
The pandemic brought challenges, and some surprising gifts, for many of us. Cancelling our 2020 conference was definitely one of the challenges. Because we had to cancel just a few weeks before the conference was scheduled to begin, we lost money already spent on the event, as well as the registration fees. These financial losses represent a substantial percentage of the annual income EVAWI needs to operate. We know that many of you are already aware of that.
What you may not know is that our last federal technical assistance (TA) grant ended in May 2021. These TA grants have been supporting the training and technical assistance programs many of you depend on. Unfortunately, the most recent round of 2021 solicitations did not include similar funding opportunities that we could apply for. [emphasis added]
Between these two developments, EVAWI is unable to continue providing all our online services free of charge, as we have done for so long. We hope this situation will change, as we emerge from the pandemic and new grant opportunities arise.
For the time being, however, we will be charging registration fees for all our live and archived webinars. That may be bad news for some of you. But the good news is that our 2021 virtual conference was extremely successful, with over 2,000 people registered to attend. Because all the sessions from this virtual conference were recorded, we can now – for the first time ever – allow people who couldn’t register for the entire conference to pay for one or more of the 68 recorded sessions. You can find the complete agenda here. Together, this means we now have a total of 120 webinars available in our archive.
Looking ahead, we are very excited about returning to an in-person conference in San Francisco in 2022, but of course also nervous as we continue to navigate new terrain and constant changes. At this time, we are doing everything we can to continue offering our OnLine Training Institute and Training Bulletins free of charge, and we will reevaluate our sustainability in early 2022 to determine if any additional changes need to be made.
We appreciate your support, as we move forward.


Law & Justice Sexual Harassment

Virginia Senate blocks strange harassment legislation, but it might still pass

By Liam Bissainthe February 9, 2021

The Virginia state senate blocked a bill that could potentially change the definition of “sexual harassment.” It would also hold even small employers liable for comments defined as either “workplace harassment” or “sexual harassment.” Employers would held liable even for conduct that occurs “outside of the workplace,” and even for conduct committed by “nonemployees” such as customers.

But the very same provisions are found in another bill passed by the Virginia House of Delegates, that is still sitting in a committee of the state senate. So the legislation could still conceivably become law.

In a 20-to-18 vote, the state senate voted on February 5 to send the first harassment bill (SB 1360) back to the Judiciary Committee, where it died on February 6. But the exact same provisions appear to be found in the second harassment bill, HB 2155, which is still alive and sitting in the General Laws committee.

Reportedly, the ladies at Richmond SHRM objected to the bill. According to a comment at the Bacon’s Rebellion blog, they were concerned that

Any offensive comment based on a protected class is potentially the basis for a claim, regardless of whether the person at whom the comment was directed files the claim or was offended.

Employees may file a claim even if they are not the victim, if the conduct occurred outside of work (arguably outside the scope of employment), and there was no harm or adverse employment action. Because sexual harassment under these bills does not have an “unwelcome” conduct standard, a third party could arguably file a claim based on mutually consensual conduct between two other people that they deem offensive.

Bystander employees may sue on his/her own and thus bring in the target of harassment even if the target wishes to remain silent and work the situation out on his/her own.”

A lawyer also raised separate concerns about the bill in articles at Bacon’s Rebellion and at CNS News. The bill states that harassment can consist of “verbal, pictorial, audio, or visual conduct.”

The bill also says “conduct may be workplace harassment regardless of whether …. the conduct occurred outside of the workplace.” But as a federal appeals court once observed, “most complaints of sexual harassment are based on actions which, although they may be permissible in some settings, are inappropriate in the workplace.” (See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 n.13 (11th Cir. 1987)).

Employers may find it very difficult to enforce workplace norms outside the workplace. Telling them to regulate conduct “regardless” of where it occurs seems like overreaching. As a judge once pointed out in her ruling in dismissing a sexual harassment lawsuit, “even top level executives are entitled to make fools of themselves after work and on their own time.” (See Alvey v. Rayovac Corp. (1996)).

There may be occasional instances where conduct outside the workplace poisons the workplace, but that’s rare enough that it’s misleading to say that conduct is harassment “regardless” of where it occurs. Often, as the court noted in the Sparks case, whether conduct occurs in the workplace makes all the difference in the world.

The bill also requires employers to take “immediate and appropriate corrective action” in response to harassment among coworkers. Surely, employers should respond promptly in cases of harassment. But “immediate” action may not be possible. What if the harassment complaint is filed after work hours, or when the supervisor is absent from the worksite?

Federal courts only require “prompt and appropriate” action, for an employer to avoid a sexual harassment lawsuit. (See, e.g., Spicer v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (“prompt and adequate”); Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 1992) (“prompt and appropriate”)).

“Immediate” action is not always feasible. For example, when employees are out of the office, or deaf employees need a sign-language interpreter, that may justify the employer taking a bit more time to figure out whether the accused employee is guilty, under the “prompt and appropriate” standard used by the courts — as one court made clear in overturning a jury verdict against an employer that took a while to figure out what action to take. (See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)).

The bill contains the following anti-employer language that may result in juries holding employers liable for conduct, even when its effect on the complainant is so trivial that the complainant could never win a harassment case under existing law:

Conduct may be workplace harassment regardless of whether (i) the complaining party is the individual being harassed; (ii) the complaining party acquiesced or otherwise submitted to or participated in the conduct; (iii) the conduct is also experienced by others outside of the protected class involved; (iv) the complaining party was able to continue carrying out the duties and responsibilities of such complaining party’s job despite the conduct; (v) the conduct caused a tangible or psychological injury; or (vi) the conduct occurred outside of the workplace.

(See proposed Va. Code § 2.2-3905(B)(9)(e)(3)).

This anti-employer language makes it seem like the conduct doesn’t need to be any big deal to the plaintiff, for the plaintiff to sue over it. Under existing law, people who sue over sexual or racial harassment, but view the conduct as “not a big deal,” lose their lawsuits. For example, a man admitted just that in his deposition, and lost his harassment lawsuit for precisely that reason. (See Newman v. Federal Express, 266 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Under federal law, conduct amounts to illegal sexual harassment when it is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive working environment for the plaintiff, from both an objective perspective (that of a reasonable person) and the subjective perspective of the plaintiff. (See Harris v. Forklift System, 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001)). This dual requirement isn’t stated in the bill, although it doesn’t rule it out, either (it doesn’t contain words like “severe or pervasive,” although neither do some state EEO laws that are interpreted by judges as requiring “severe or pervasive” conduct for liability. Some campus sexual or racial harassment codes that banned racist or sexist speech but didn’t have language requiring that it be “severe or pervasive” were struck down as a a result, as being overly broad restrictions on free speech. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008)).

In comments to the Senate Finance Committee, Senator McClellan, chief sponsor of the bill, indicated that the bill incorporates existing legal standards on what is “sexual harassment.” But that claim is questionable given its text.

For example, the bill says conduct can be harassment “regardless” of whether “the complaining party is [not] the individual being harassed.” But if the complaining party isn’t being harassed, that’s a strong sign that the complaining party’s own work environment wasn’t hostile, which means she can’t sue under existing law. That’s because “the impact of ‘second-hand harassment’ is obviously not as great as the impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff,” notes a federal appeals court. (See Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, 118 F.3d 1134, 1144 (7th Cir. 1997)).

The bill also says conduct can be harassment “regardless” of whether “the conduct is also experienced by others outside of the protected class involved.” But if the conduct is experienced by men and women alike, that is a sign that the conduct is not discriminatory, and is not a form of discriminatory harassment, such as sexual harassment, under existing law. Instead, the conduct may simply be a normal part of the job. For example, the California Supreme Court rejected a sexual harassment lawsuit over conduct that was not aimed at the plaintiff — sexual jokes by comedy writers that were part of the process of producing an adult-oriented sitcom — because the conduct wasn’t aimed at the plaintiff based on her sex. The conduct may have offended her, but it didn’t treat women worse than men, and sexual humor was simply a necessary part of producing an adult-oriented sitcom. (See Lyle v. Warner Brothers, 132 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2006)).

The bill also doesn’t include the word “unwelcome” in its definition of sexual harassment. The Supreme Court has always said that conduct has to be “unwelcome” to be sexual harassment. Not including the word “unwelcome” in the definition of sexual harassment might lead to people suing over offensive remarks they themselves instigated (and thus objectively welcomed) or, conceivably, people suing over “welcome” but offensive relationships among their peers. Under existing law, if you instigate an exchange you can’t sue over it, such as when you say something vulgar or profane, and your co-workers respond in kind. (See Scusa v. Nestle USA, 181 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1998)).

Virginia Senate blocks strange harassment legislation, but it might still pass – Liberty Unyielding

Department of Education Department of Justice Due Process Law & Justice Legal Office for Civil Rights Sexual Assault Title IX

The Biden Plan For Title IX Must Protect Due Process

By: MICHAEL POLIAKOFF | January 25, 2021

The 18th-century British jurist William Blackstone pronounced, “It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” There are few principles of law we hold more sacred than “innocent until proven guilty.” For most of the last decade, however, this doctrine has had negligible impact in matters of campus sexual assault.

There are policies of the previous administration that President Joe Biden is already in the process of overturning or altering. It would be well, however, for him to reconsider his campaign promise to “return to and then build on” the Obama administration’s Title IX policies, which led to more than 500 investigations of accused students and shattered an untold number of lives. Having himself been the object of unproven allegations of sexual assault, he must look into his own heart before reinstituting campus procedures that make a mockery of justice.

The victim of sexual assault is likely to bear the emotional and psychological scars for years to come. It is a moral imperative for an institution of learning to protect students from the trauma that ensues. But the mirror image of that horror happens when an innocent person is unjustly found guilty of sexual assault and punished – typically by expulsion or long-term suspension – by his college. The reputational scars and career damage may last a lifetime. Due process provides a greater likelihood that punishment will fall on the guilty and not those wrongfully accused.

There are many instances in which the courts have found wrongful prosecution. Sometimes the case hinged on spectacular mendacity, like the invented account of a brutal gang rape in a University of Virginia fraternity house in 2014 that provided Rolling Stone with a fraudulent cover story. Or the dishonest prosecution launched by an opportunistic district attorney—later disbarred—of Duke lacrosse players that showed how quickly a prestigious university, from the president on down, called for punishment when no crime was committed.

Last spring, U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos signed a Final Rule that provided key definitions and regulations for the enforcement of Title IX when students accuse other students of campus sexual assault. In addition to the rule’s protection of alleged victims, including reporting procedures and survivor support, it notably provides to the accused the rights to present, cross-examine, and challenge evidence in campus hearings.

You do not have to be a constitutional scholar to recognize that Secretary DeVos was right to redress a longstanding ethical and procedural abuse. The Biden administration must not reverse her important work and bring back the guilt-presuming process that the Obama administration demanded in its April 4, 2011, “Dear Colleague Letter” and in subsequent, egregious misinterpretations of Title IX.

These extra-legal Department of Education decrees, which never went through a formal regulatory review process, pressured universities to stack proceedings against accused students. They even threatened to take away institutions’ federal funding if they allowed cross-examination of accusers in campus hearings. Thus, did the Obama administration deprive accused students of what the Supreme Court has repeatedly called “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”

“Innocent until proven guilty” does not fare well against dramatic claims of sexual violence. At the extreme end, recall then-congressman Jared Polis, now governor, who inverted Blackstone’s wisdom by stating in a House higher education subcommittee meeting on sexual assault: “If there are 10 people who have been accused, and under a reasonable likelihood standard, maybe one or two did it, it seems better to get rid of all 10 people. We’re not talking about depriving them of life or liberty, we’re talking about them being transfer to another university, for crying out loud.”

For crying out loud, indeed. What college or university is going to admit a person, innocent or not, who has been expelled on a charge of sexual assault? What company, scholarship foundation, or professional school is going to take that person whose academic record will forever show expulsion or even suspension for sexual assault?

President Biden should consider documented cases like that of the Amherst student who was expelled based on a woman’s claim that he had forced her into sexual contact more than 20 months before—even though her own text messages proved that in fact she had been the active party when he was blackout drunk in her room.

Had the accusations hurled against President Biden on the campaign trail been leveled years ago against College Joe and adjudicated under a campus regime like the one later decreed by the Obama-Biden administration, he would probably have had no meaningful chance to defend himself or clear his name. His career and American history would have been entirely different.

Michael Poliakoff is president of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni, an independent, non-profit organization committed to academic freedom, excellence, and accountability at America’s colleges and universities. He previously served as vice president for academic affairs and research at the University of Colorado and in senior roles at the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Pennsylvania Department of Education. He has taught at Georgetown University, George Washington University, Hillsdale College, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Wellesley College. He received his undergraduate degree magna cum laude from Yale University, a Class I Honours B.A. at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and a Ph.D. in classical studies from the University of Michigan.

The Biden Plan For Title IX Must Protect Due Process (